Poisoned JavaScript served through Optimizely, the A/B testing service many big brands use, and three other script providers reached visitors of BBC, CNN, Zoom, Fox News, Salesforce, HSBC’s UAE website and others between November 13 and 16, 2026. Researchers call the campaign OptimJack. This guide explains what the code did, how to tell whether it matters for you, and the exact steps to take as a visitor or as a site owner.
Key takeaways
- Poisoned scripts served through Optimizely and three other providers reached visitors of BBC, CNN, Zoom, Fox News, HSBC’s UAE website and others between November 13 and 16, 2026.
- The Optimizely payload swapped crypto wallet addresses and tried to skim card numbers; for iPhone and iPad visitors it loaded extra scripts linked to exploit kits.
- Most visitors only need to act if they entered a card or sent crypto on an affected page, or browsed one on an iPhone or iPad.
- Site owners should check the bytes their Optimizely file actually serves, read the project’s change history, remove the code and rotate access.
What happened
On November 16, independent researcher Amirul Cyber published “OptimJack,” showing attacker code inside Optimizely bundles served to visitors of household-name sites. The same evening, Hudson Rock’s research team published a longer report after recovering eight poisoned Optimizely project files and a loader from a fourth provider. Security researcher Scott Helme wrote on X that he was tracking a breach of a third-party JavaScript host “impacting hundreds of high value websites.”
Hudson Rock’s report, which adds evidence from a researcher at the group Ohey, found poisoned code in files served by four providers: Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. Only the Optimizely files carried the card and wallet code; the other three loaded the iPhone branch described below. The earliest verified capture is from November 13 at 05:42 UTC. It also stresses what is not known: how the attackers got in (provider systems, publishing credentials, integrations or customer accounts), how many people loaded the code, and whether anyone actually lost money or had a device compromised. Report URI later traced about $7,040 to the attacker’s wallets (see the update below).
The main payload, according to Hudson Rock’s analysis, did four things in the browser:
- Crypto address swapping. It looked for wallet addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, TRON, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin in page text, form fields and copy-paste, and replaced them with the attacker’s.
- Card skimming. It watched form submissions and web requests for a valid card number, expiry date and CVV, then tried to send them to the attacker.
- Conditional data collection. In some cases it sent the page address, cookies that JavaScript can read, and a rendered image of the page.
- An iPhone branch. For visitors identified as iPhone or iPad, it loaded extra scripts from infrastructure Hudson Rock links to the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The report says this shows delivery, not a proven iPhone compromise.
As of 23:10 UTC on November 16, 2026, we found no security statement from Optimizely, and no named site had published a notice. Some files were already clean by then: a researcher saw BBC’s file without the injection at about 21:10 UTC, and when we fetched GitLab’s project file at 23:06 UTC it no longer contained the attacker’s domain.
Update, November 17, 2026: Scott Helme’s company Report URI published a fuller analysis. It checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organizations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock and several HSBC country sites, including hsbc.ae. It says the attacker wrote code into the optional “Project JavaScript” field of customer projects, so the files still came from Optimizely’s own CDN; how the attacker got that access is still unknown. Most snippets were cleaned between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC on November 16, and by 21:52 UTC only one of the 188 was still infected. Report URI says the card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC on November 16, that cards typed into hosted payment frames such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach, and that the attacker’s wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC. On iPhone and iPad, pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds as the exploit retried, and the kit’s own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. As of 01:05 UTC on November 17, we found no security statement from Optimizely.
By the numbers
November 13earliest verified poisoned capture
149 millionBBC.com monthly audience, not victims
23:06 UTCwhen we found GitLab’s file clean
Which sites were named
These are the web properties Hudson Rock lists with direct file or archived-response evidence. A listing means a poisoned file was served there at least once. It does not mean every page or every visit was affected.
| Provider | Web properties named in the evidence |
|---|---|
| Optimizely | BBC, CNN, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab’s marketing site, HSBC UAE’s public website, Hootsuite, Talkwalker, Virgin Media O2 (an ID help page), Stamps.com, Tricentis, Mutual of Omaha |
| minute-ly | Fox Sports |
| Kissmetrics | Security Bank, BuzzStream and one small IT firm’s site |
| StorifyMe | FAZ, Sydney Morning Herald, University of Basel, vidaXL UK |
Amirul Cyber’s list also includes American Eagle through a different script. Hudson Rock warns that audience figures, such as BBC.com’s 149 million monthly visitors outside the UK, are not victim counts. For readers in the Gulf, the HSBC finding concerns the public hsbc.ae website, not online banking or the HSBC app.
Should you worry? A 2-minute check
Ask yourself three questions about November 13-16, 2026:
- Did you visit one of the sites above in a web browser? The reports cover websites, not the companies’ apps.
- On a site in the Optimizely row, did you type a card number, or paste or send a crypto address while the page was open? Most visits to a news article involve neither.
- Did you browse one of them on an iPhone or iPad? The iPhone branch matters only for those devices.
Timing matters. According to Report URI’s later analysis, the first Optimizely injection it saw was at 04:21 UTC on November 16 (the earlier wave from November 13 came through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts), and the card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC on November 16 and ran until most files were cleaned that evening.
If you answered no to all three, you don’t need to do anything beyond normal habits. If any answer is yes, follow the steps below.
What to do now if you were on an affected site
- Check any crypto transfer you made while on an Optimizely-row site. Open your wallet’s transaction history and compare the destination address with the one the recipient gave you, using a second channel such as a message from them or their official app. The code swapped addresses on the page and in copy-paste; Hudson Rock found no code that takes private keys or seed phrases. A confirmed blockchain transfer usually can’t be reversed, so report a mismatch to the exchange or platform you used right away.
- Call your card issuer if you entered a card on a named site. Use the number on the back of the card or the bank’s app, say the card may have been skimmed, and ask for a replacement number. The FTC says to report fast and follow up in writing, because your protection depends on the type of card and when you report.
- Watch your statements for the next few weeks. Report any charge you don’t recognize immediately, as the FTC advises.
- Update your iPhone or iPad. Go to Settings > General > Software Update and install the newest version (Apple’s steps). Exploit kits target older iOS versions. An update won’t remove anything already installed, so if you have strong signs of compromise, get professional help.
- Consider Lockdown Mode only if you are a likely target. Apple describes Lockdown Mode as an extreme protection for the very few people who might be personally targeted because of who they are or what they do, and says most people are never targeted this way. It turns on in Settings > Privacy & Security > Lockdown Mode.
- Sign out and back in on the named sites if you were logged in. The code could read cookies that aren’t marked HttpOnly. Signing out ends that session on most sites. If you see account activity you don’t recognize, change that password; if you reused it elsewhere, change it there too.
- Ignore “your account was hacked” calls and emails tied to this story. Big incidents bring follow-up phishing. Contact the company through its own website or app, not a link you were sent. Our first-24-hours checklist covers what to do if a real notice arrives.

For site owners: check your Optimizely project
If your site loads Optimizely Web Experimentation, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or minute-ly, check what visitors actually receive, not just your own code.
- Find your snippet URL. Open your site in a browser, open DevTools > Network, filter on “optimizely,” and reload. You’ll see a file like
cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.jsorcdn.optimizely.com/public/<account-id>/s/<name>.js. - Search the served file for the known indicators. Hudson Rock says some versions hid the URL in Base64, so this also searches the three Base64 forms of the attacker’s domain:
curl -s "https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js" | grep -c -E '1688360|webshell\.lol|\.icu/|MTY4ODM2MC5j|E2ODgzNjAu|xNjg4MzYwLmNj'
Expected output on a clean file:
0
Any number above 0 means you should treat the project as compromised. Save a copy of the file and its hash before you change anything, because you’ll need it for the investigation:
curl -s "https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project-id>.js" -o snippet-copy.js
shasum -a 256 snippet-copy.js
- Read the project’s change history. In Optimizely, open the project and go to History, then expand Show details. Optimizely’s docs say it records Project JavaScript changes, who made them, and whether the change came from the web UI or the REST API. An edit you can’t explain is your lead.
- Remove the injected code, then rotate access. Restore clean Project JavaScript, republish, and fetch the file again to confirm the count is 0. Then rotate Optimizely API tokens, review collaborators, and enforce two-factor sign-in for everyone with publish rights.
- Tighten your Content Security Policy. A
script-srcallowlist plus a reporting endpoint makes unknown script hosts fail loudly. MDN’s CSP guide covers the syntax. Amirul Cyber says two affected sites blocked the payload this way. Hudson Rock adds that domain blocks alone are not enough, because the BBC and HSBC UAE files carried a full embedded copy of the payload. - Check your sensitive pages separately. Find out whether checkout, login or account pages loaded the file between November 13 and the fix. That decides whether you have a card-data or session problem to report, and to whom.
Did you know?
Blocking the attacker’s domain is not enough: the BBC and HSBC UAE files carried a full embedded copy of the payload.
Common mistakes
| Mistake | Why it’s a problem | Do this instead |
|---|---|---|
| “Our servers are clean, so we’re fine” | The code ran in visitors’ browsers from a third-party file | Check the bytes your visitors receive |
| Blocking the attacker’s domain and stopping there | Some files carried an embedded copy of the payload | Remove the injected project code |
| Checking only today’s file | Files changed during the incident, and some are already clean | Keep archived copies, hashes and timestamps |
| Telling every visitor they were hacked | A listed page doesn’t prove anyone’s data was taken | Scope by page, date and what was entered |
| Treating Optimizely’s status page as the answer | Its open incident on November 16 was about Recommendations reporting, not security | Read the vendor’s security advisory once it’s published |

What it means for you
Your browser runs code from dozens of companies when you open a big site, not just from the site itself. That’s why a trusted brand name doesn’t guarantee a safe page, and why the habits that help are boring ones: check crypto addresses through a second channel before you send, use a card with strong fraud protection online, keep your phone and browser patched, and be suspicious of anything that rewrites what you just pasted. Crypto users have seen this pattern before, from address-swapping malware to tampered hardware wallets. More guides like this live in our Security section.
Frequently asked questions
Was Optimizely hacked?
Poisoned code was served from Optimizely’s CDN inside customer project files, but Hudson Rock says the access route is unknown: it could be provider systems, publishing credentials, integrations or customer accounts. As of 01:05 UTC on November 17, 2026, we found no security statement from Optimizely.
I read a BBC or CNN article this week. Was my card stolen?
Probably not. A listed page doesn’t prove anyone’s data was taken, and the card code only mattered if you typed a card number on the affected page. If you did, call your card issuer and ask for a replacement number.
Does the attack affect the BBC, Zoom or HSBC apps?
The reports cover websites, not the companies’ apps. For HSBC, the finding concerns the public hsbc.ae website, not online banking or the HSBC app.
Should I turn on Lockdown Mode on my iPhone?
Only if you might be personally targeted because of who you are or what you do. Apple says most people are never targeted this way. Everyone should install the newest iOS update.
Quick quiz
Where did the malicious code run?
- On the news sites’ servers
- In visitors’ browsers, from a third-party file
- Inside Optimizely’s mobile app
The code was inside third-party script files that visitors’ browsers loaded, so a site’s own servers could be clean.
Why isn’t blocking the attacker’s domain enough for site owners?
- Some files carried an embedded copy of the payload
- The domain can’t be blocked
- Browsers ignore blocks
Hudson Rock found a full embedded payload in the BBC and HSBC UAE files.
Which Optimizely page shows who changed Project JavaScript?
- Billing
- History
- Audiences
Optimizely’s docs say the project’s History records Project JavaScript changes, who made them and whether via the UI or REST API.
Sources
- Hudson Rock / Infostealers: Poisoned Scripts on BBC, Zoom and Other Major Websites Linked to iPhone Exploit Loaders (November 16, 2026)
- Amirul Cyber: CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer, OptimJack (November 16, 2026)
- Optimizely: View change history (Web Experimentation docs)
- MDN: Content Security Policy (CSP)
- Apple: Update your iPhone or iPad
- Apple: About Lockdown Mode
- FTC: Lost or Stolen Credit, ATM, and Debit Cards
- Report URI (Scott Helme): World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (November 16, 2026)





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