4,800 GitHub Accounts Hijacked: How to Audit Your GitHub Account in 10 Minutes

Aikido reports 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts probing 61,764 repositories. Here is a 10-minute audit of sessions, SSH keys, tokens and apps, using GitHub’s own docs.

Reviewed by Mindloop Editorial on . Every link in the Sources section at the end was re-checked that day.

Graphic of a browser window with a GitHub-style security checklist and shield illustrating a GitHub account audit.

Picture a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”. It is dull on purpose. According to security firm Aikido, that title was a probe: attackers using 4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts opened it across 61,764 repositories to see where their stolen credentials had write access.

Key takeaways

  • Aikido says attackers used 4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts to open probe pull requests across 61,764 repositories.
  • Where probes found write access, malicious automation harvested CI secrets, cloud credentials and AI service keys.
  • You can audit your own account in about 10 minutes: security log, sessions, SSH keys, tokens, apps and 2FA.
  • Look for a wfx-docs branch, a docs: dependency audit notes pull request, and gaps in workflow run numbers.

Aikido says the campaign started on 10 November 2026, and that the probes mostly went unnoticed: 92% of those aimed at repositories the compromised accounts do not own were still open. This guide shows how to audit your own GitHub account in about 10 minutes, using GitHub’s own documentation for every menu path.

What happened, in short

Aikido, which published its findings on 12 November and calls the campaign “wfx-loot”, says the attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to open probe pull requests. Where a probe showed write access, malicious automation was added that harvested CI secrets (the passwords and keys your build pipeline uses) and cloud credentials. BleepingComputer’s coverage of Aikido’s report names AWS, Azure and Google Cloud among the targets, plus AI service keys.

A few details worth knowing:

  • Aikido says at least 1,835 repositories ran the payload and had credentials sent out, though another figure in its article is 1,806.
  • At least 50 of the compromised accounts appear to publish packages on ecosystems such as npm, PyPI and Go.
  • The attacker reportedly reverted its changes within a minute and deleted the workflow runs and logs, so Aikido warns the real numbers may be higher.
  • Aikido does not say how the credentials were stolen, and the other reports reviewed do not either. That is a good reason to audit the account itself.

By the numbers

4,837hijacked GitHub accounts

61,764repositories probed

92%probes on others’ repos still open

What you need

  • A GitHub account you can sign in to.
  • About 10 minutes, and a phone or password manager nearby in case you need to re-authenticate.
  • Optional: Terminal or Git Bash for the SSH fingerprint check.
Five-step flow for a GitHub account audit covering security log, sessions, keys, tokens, apps and two-factor

Step 1: Read your security log (2 minutes)

  1. Click your profile picture at the top right, then Settings.
  2. In the Archives section of the sidebar, click Security log.

GitHub’s docs say the log covers the last 90 days. Entries are named category.operation. Look for unfamiliar entries in public_key (SSH keys), personal_access_token, oauth_authorization, passkey and two_factor_authentication. You can filter with qualifiers such as operation:create, operation:access or actor:your-username.

Expected result: a list you recognize. Anything you did not do is your cue to continue carefully through the steps below.

Step 2: Revoke sessions you don’t recognize (1 minute)

  1. Settings, then Sessions in the Access section.
  2. Under Web sessions, select See more to inspect one, then Revoke session.
  3. Under GitHub Mobile sessions, select Revoke next to any device you no longer use.

Step 3: Review SSH keys (2 minutes)

  1. Settings, then SSH and GPG keys in the Access section.
  2. Under SSH keys, click Delete on any key you do not recognize or no longer use.

Optionally compare fingerprints on your computer with the ones listed on GitHub:

Code
eval "$(ssh-agent -s)"
ssh-add -l -E sha256

GitHub’s docs say that if you see an unfamiliar key, delete it immediately and contact GitHub Support. If you have not set up keys before, our SSH keys guide walks through it.

Video: Claude Code Can Leak Your Secrets to GitHub: Fix It in 2 Minutes (settings.local.json) (Mindloop Experience)

Step 4: Delete tokens you don’t use (2 minutes)

  1. Settings, then Developer settings in the left sidebar.
  2. Under Personal access tokens, open Fine-grained tokens and Tokens (classic).
  3. Click Delete next to any token you do not recognize or no longer need.

GitHub automatically removes personal access tokens that have not been used in a year and recommends setting an expiration date when you create one.

Did you know?

GitHub automatically removes personal access tokens that have not been used in a year, and it recommends setting an expiration date whenever you create one.

Step 5: Prune authorized apps (1 minute)

  1. Settings, then Applications in the Integrations section.
  2. On the Authorized OAuth Apps tab, click the three-dot icon next to an unfamiliar app, then Revoke.
  3. Repeat on the Authorized GitHub Apps tab, using GitHub’s page on reviewing and revoking GitHub Apps.

Step 6: Check two-factor authentication (1 minute)

Open Settings, then Password and authentication in the Access section. GitHub says it strongly recommends an authenticator (TOTP) app, notes that passkeys let you sign in without typing a password, and advises against SMS because it can be intercepted. Make sure your recovery codes are saved somewhere safe.

Step 7: Check your repositories for the campaign’s fingerprints (1 minute)

Aikido’s indicators that matter to a normal repo owner:

  • A branch named wfx-docs.
  • A pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes”.
  • Gaps in your workflow run numbers. Aikido calls a missing run number on the attacker’s commit “the more reliable sign” that the payload ran.

If a malicious workflow ran in a repository, Aikido says to assume every secret and cloud role available to its workflows is compromised. In practice that means rotating those secrets and cloud credentials in each provider’s console.

Three indicators of the wfx-loot GitHub campaign: a wfx-docs branch, a probe pull request and gaps in run numbers

Common errors and fixes

  • The log stops 90 days back. That is GitHub’s limit. Note anything odd now.
  • A deploy key vanished. Per GitHub’s docs, deleting a personal access token that was used to create a deploy key deletes the key as well.
  • You cannot revoke someone else’s app. Only the person who authorized a GitHub App can revoke it. Organization owners can uninstall it from the organization.
  • Probe pull request on a repo you do not own. Aikido says some probes landed through collaborator or organization access. Tell the repository’s owners.

Did you know?

Deleting a personal access token that was used to create a deploy key also deletes that deploy key, according to GitHub’s docs.

Where this leaves you

Nothing here proves your account was touched. If you find something unfamiliar, our data breach checklist covers the broader clean-up. Details may change as researchers update their numbers, so recheck the sources below. As of 15 November 2026, neither Aikido’s report nor BleepingComputer’s article includes a GitHub statement.

Frequently asked questions

How do I check if my GitHub account was compromised?

Open Settings, then Security log under Archives. It covers the last 90 days. Look for unfamiliar entries in public_key, personal_access_token, oauth_authorization, passkey and two_factor_authentication, then review sessions, keys, tokens and apps.

What is the wfx-loot campaign?

It is the name Aikido gave a campaign starting 10 November 2026 in which stolen GitHub credentials were used to open probe pull requests, then add malicious automation that harvested CI secrets and cloud credentials where write access existed.

What should I do if a malicious workflow ran in my repository?

Aikido says to assume every secret and cloud role available to that repository’s workflows is compromised. In practice that means rotating those secrets and cloud credentials in each provider’s console.

Which two-factor method does GitHub recommend?

GitHub strongly recommends an authenticator (TOTP) app, notes that passkeys let you sign in without typing a password, and advises against SMS because it can be intercepted. Keep your recovery codes somewhere safe.

Quick quiz

How far back does GitHub’s security log go?

  • 30 days
  • 90 days
  • One year

GitHub’s docs say the security log covers the last 90 days.

What does Aikido call the more reliable sign that the payload ran?

  • A missing workflow run number
  • A new SSH key
  • A changed README

Aikido calls a missing run number on the attacker’s commit the more reliable sign.

Who can revoke a GitHub App authorization?

  • Any repository collaborator
  • GitHub Support only
  • The person who authorized it

Only the person who authorized a GitHub App can revoke it; organization owners can uninstall it.

Sources

Links last checked on 15 November 2026.

Written by Mindloop Editorial

The Mindloop Experience editorial team writes clear, carefully sourced explainers and how-tos on AI and technology, software and the business of tech, for anyone who likes to know how things actually work.

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